As UNGA 81 begins, the UN faces a changing Sahel demanding greater sovereignty.

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For a decade, the United Nations’s most visible role in the Sahel was its peacekeeping mission in Mali.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by the Security Council in 2013. Its mandate was terminated in June 2023 at the request of Mali’s transitional government, and the mission completed its withdrawal by the end of that year.

But the end of MINUSMA did not end the UN’s engagement with the region.

Its political work continues through the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), while the wider UN system remains involved in humanitarian and development work.

What has changed is the space in which that engagement takes place.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger formally left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on January 29, 2025. The three countries have also deepened cooperation through the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), putting sovereignty and strategic autonomy at the centre of their political message.

The humanitarian pressures, meanwhile, have not eased.

Displacement, insecurity, food insecurity and other pressures continue to cross borders, even as governments increasingly insist on handling their security and political affairs on their own terms.

The question is what influence the UN can exercise after the departure of the peacekeeping force that once represented its most substantial presence in the region.

The UN’s role today is less about troops and more about diplomacy, mediation, humanitarian assistance and development.

UNOWAS is a special political mission rather than a peacekeeping operation. Its work includes preventive diplomacy, good offices, political mediation, conflict prevention and support for political dialogue.

“The influence the UN can actually exercise is narrow. The AES states have stripped away the mechanisms that once gave outside institutions leverage, leaving ECOWAS and the Rome Statute, and building their own confederation and joint force instead,” said Mubarak Aliyu, a political and security analyst in Nigeria.

In February 2026, the Security Council extended UNOWAS’s mandate until January 31, 2029, while requesting an independent strategic review of its mandate and activities, to be finalised by September 30, 2026.

The review comes as West Africa’s political landscape is being reshaped by military governments, new regional alliances and a stronger emphasis on sovereignty.

Russia has also become an important part of that changing security picture.

“What has actually shaped events this year is Russia’s Africa Corps, which helped Mali’s and Niger’s military governments survive shocks the UN was never positioned to influence, functioning mainly as regime protection rather than counterinsurgency,” Aliyu said.

“Moscow’s leverage extends into the Security Council chamber too, since its veto shapes what collective action the Council can attempt on Mali in the first place.”

Kabir Adamu, founder and managing director of Beacon Security and Innovations Limited, an Abuja-based firm that provides security solutions in Nigeria, the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel, said the UN should shift its approach away from large deployments of UN troops to diplomatic and towards diplomatic and development solutions.

“Looking ahead, the UN’s priorities in the Sahel should promote effective security sector governance and security sector reform. This will mean pivoting from traditional, large-scale peacekeeping to deep-rooted and core preventive strategies and diplomacy that addresses the root causes of fragility, conflict and violence, as well as instability,” Adamu said.

For the United Nations, diplomacy has become more important as governments turn to other security partnerships and regional arrangements.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have made sovereignty and strategic autonomy central to their political outlook and built the AES as a framework for closer cooperation.

Their departure from ECOWAS has changed the regional architecture through which West African governments have traditionally dealt with political and security crises.

The UN still works with regional organisations, including ECOWAS and the African Union, but governments no longer share one political framework or the same approach to external engagement.

Consequently, for the UN, maintaining vital political channels has become potentially more difficult.

Adamu said the fragmented security architecture means the UN should seek to work with and through regional organisations and groups, rather than establishing its own large-scale forces.

“As national security structures remain weak and extractive, and regional security architecture fragments, marked by the rise of the Alliance of Sahel States and shifting ECOWAS dynamics, the UN should prioritise pragmatic, inclusive mediation to bridge divides between Sahelian and coastal states, while actively bolstering alternative, functioning frameworks like MNJTF [Multinational Joint Task] and the Accra Initiative,” he said.

The retreat of peacekeepers has not removed the pressures that brought international organisations into the region in the first place.

Displacement, armed violence, organised crime, food insecurity and climate pressures continue to overlap across the Sahel.

Climate change is perhaps not the root cause of the instability, but environmental and economic pressures can add to existing vulnerabilities, particularly where state institutions are weak and communities are already dealing with conflict and displacement.

For the UN, humanitarian work remains one of the areas where engagement can continue, even when governments reject large-scale military intervention.

Humanitarian work also places greater emphasis on local and regional capacity.

“Crucially, the UN must double down on the core UNISS pillars of governance, resilience, and security by integrating climate-peace initiatives and empowering local capacities, ensuring that international engagement remains flexible, locally owned, and focused on sustainable, multidimensional stability rather than solely militarised responses,” Adamu said.

While the UN cannot determine the security partnerships of sovereign governments or force political processes on authorities that reject them, it can still facilitate dialogue, support humanitarian operations and raise regional crises before the wider international community.

The 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly opened on September 8, 2026, with its General Debate due to begin on September 22.

The UNGA meets with no UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger outside ECOWAS, while the AES has become a separate framework for their political and security cooperation.

“That leaves the UN closer to an advocate and service provider than a shaper of outcomes,” Aliyu said. “It can report, brief, fund aid operations and press for access, but it cannot compel it or offer the regime security that has made Russia indispensable to the military governments.”

Yet for the Sahel, insecurity, displacement, humanitarian needs and economic and climate pressures remain.

In the changed regional environment, the UN’s influence is more likely to come through diplomacy than force, through access rather than authority, and through regional relationships rather than a large international security presence.