Is Japan trying to build bridges with China after Taiwan spat?

A delegation of Japanese politicians has travelled to Beijing this week in what observers say may be a bid to improve relations amid one of the worst rifts with China since the 1970s.

Among those in Japan’s delegation is Gaku Hashimoto, a member of the House of Representatives and Takaichi’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), alongside lawmakers from the opposition Komeito and Centrist Reform Alliance parties.

A diplomatic spat began in November last year when Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said if China were to attack Taiwan, it could “constitute a survival-threatening situation” for Japan that would justify the use of force.

Her comments angered Beijing. The next day, Xue Jian, China’s consul general in Osaka, wrote on X: “We have no choice but cut off that dirty neck that has been lunged at us without hesitation”, alongside an article about Takaichi. The post was later deleted.

Tokyo lodged a protest and asked for him to be disciplined; Beijing refused, and instead warned its citizens against travel to Japan alongside tightened trade restrictions.

This year, China ramped up tensions further, restricting exports of dual-use goods and rare earth materials which are necessary for building many high-tech products from smartphones to fighter jets.

So why is a Japanese delegation visiting China this week, and does Japan need China more than it may care to admit?

What historical grievances have there been between Japan and China?

Baked into this diplomatic spat are longstanding grievances between the two nations, traceable to the late 19th century.

Japan seized Taiwan from China in 1895 after winning the First Sino-Japanese War. It also occupied Manchuria – a historical region covering northeast China and parts of Russia – in 1931 and launched a full-scale invasion of China six years later, in a war that killed millions.

In 1945, Japan surrendered at the end of the World War II and the Republic of China (ROC) took control of Taiwan.

But in 1949, after losing the Chinese Civil War on the mainland, the ROC government relocated to Taipei, separating Taiwan from the rest of China ever since.

Beijing continues to claim Taiwan as its own territory, although the People’s Republic of China has never governed the island.

In 1972, the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the government of the People’s Republic of China was signed in Beijing. It normalised diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC in mainland China, and Japan ended official relations with the ROC in Taiwan.

Against this historical backdrop, however, Beijing is likely to read any Japanese talk of military force as evidence of a return to wartime militarism, analysts say.

How bad are relations between Japan and China right now?

In November last year, Beijing imposed a ban on Japanese seafood following the comments regarding Taiwan by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Then, in January, it restricted exports of dual-use goods and rare earth minerals for defence or military uses. Dual-use goods include software and technology with potential military or weapons-development applications.

In February, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) placed 40 Japanese entities under restrictive trade measures relating to dual-use goods. It issued a separate “watch list” of 20 companies for which Chinese exporters must submit individual licence applications, risk assessment reports and written commitments that items will not be used for military or defensive capabilities.

China also issued travel warnings, discouraging its citizens from visiting Japan in an attempt to dent Japan’s vital tourism sector.

According to Shinichi Isa, a politician who has previously served at the Japanese embassy in China, bilateral ties have sunk to their lowest since the 1972 normalisation of relations.

In a post on X earlier this month, he wrote that officials had always remained in communication even during previous lows: “Now all channels between officials and ministries have been cut off.”

Beijing has also noted the severity of the situation, with its Foreign Ministry urging the Japanese government on Friday to take its diplomats’ efforts to repair relations “seriously” and to “take concrete actions” to normalise relations.

Dylan Loh, an associate professor in the Public Policy and Global Affairs programme at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, told Al Jazeera that bilateral relations “have dropped to their lowest in recent memory; communications have ground to a halt, and there is even more mistrust at both the elite and people-to-people level”.

Can Japan afford to fall out with China?

Chinese arrivals in Japan slumped from 715,700 in October 2025 to 330,000 in December, with visitors from mainland China and Hong Kong normally making up about one-fifth of all visitors, according to a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in February. 

However, the report also found that the economic effect was minimal, partly due to a weak yen, as spending by tourists from Taiwan, South Korea, the United States, and Hong Kong offset the decline in Chinese arrivals.

The restrictions on exports of rare earth metals from China are more worrying, however.

China, which supplies about 80 percent of Japan’s rare earth imports, shipped no dysprosium or terbium oxide to Japan between November 2025 and May 2026. These elements are essential for the manufacture of high-performance magnets required for a variety of technological applications, fluorescent lights, and nuclear energy and defence components.

Motor vehicle manufacturers Nissan and Suzuki have reported supply disruptions as a result.

Masahiro Matsumura, professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, told Al Jazeera that the squeeze will eventually be managed, but not quickly. “Over the medium and long run, the impact is likely managed through diversification, including rare earth issues, which is a focal point,” he said.

Japan has diversified the supply of some of these, he said, but still relies on China for others that matter, something he described as a “great headache” for the government and for Japanese high-tech firms.

Elsewhere, Beijing has been more careful.

“Beijing still welcomes Japanese direct investment, even as many Japanese investors have begun an exodus from China – though some dare to stay,” he said.

He noted that China has not clamped down on financial outflows in yen the way it polices capital flight in US dollars.

“Beijing has taken a selective approach to Japan,” he said.

Is the US still a reliable ally for Japan?

Yes, but not as much as it used to be, experts say.

There are concerns in Japan and among other US allies in Asia, as Washington scales back some military assets in the region to meet its needs in the Middle East, where the US-Israel war on Iran drags on.

Last week, the US moved its last aircraft carrier in Asia from Japan to the Middle East, a move that follows reports earlier this year that the US had moved parts of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system from South Korea to use against Iran.

Such moves appear to have emboldened Beijing, with the Chinese fleet moving beyond the First Island Chain, which runs from north of Japan through Taiwan and the northern Philippines to Borneo.

William Yang, senior analyst for Northeast Asia at the International Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera that US redeployments away from the region do dent US power projection in Asia, and its ability to counter threats from China.

However, Taiwanese and Japanese security experts say US interest, along with its aircraft carriers, can be expected to ultimately return to Asia.

Can bridges be repaired?

Experts say it is too early to tell, but the cross-party delegation of politicians visiting China this week is a good sign.

While there are no high hopes of any substantial outcome, it is a “modest start” to, at the very least, have a dialogue, Loh said.

Matsumura cautioned, however, that politicians who travel to Beijing in what he calls “parliamentarian caucus diplomacy”, “are not necessarily aligned” with the Takaichi administration’s policy lines.

“Nor is the ruling party itself of one mind. Even in the LDP, there is a latent struggle between anti-China/pro-US and pro-China/anti-US,” he said.

In other words, the delegation may say less about where Takaichi stands than about who in Tokyo wants to open a channel, regardless.